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Digital signature is a key technique in information security, especially for identity authentications.
Compared with classical correspondence, quantum digital signatures (QDSs) provide a considerably
higher level of security, i.e., information-theoretic security. At present, its performance is limited
by key generation protocols (e.g., BB84 or measurement-device-independent protocols), which are
fundamentally limited in terms of channel capacity. Fortunately, the recently proposed twin-field
quantum key distribution can overcome this limit. This paper presents a twin-field QDS protocol and
details a corresponding security analysis. In its distribution stage, a specific key generation protocol,
the sending-or-not-sending twin-field protocol, has been adopted and full parameter optimization
method has been implemented. Numerical simulation results show that the new protocol exhibits
outstanding security and practicality compared with all other existing protocols. Therefore, the new
protocol paves the way toward real-world applications of QDSs.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 42.65.Lm
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital signatures (DSs) possess wide applications in validating the authenticity and integrity of digital documents
such as financial transactions and electronic contracts. Present digital signatures, hereafter called classical digital
signatures, possess security levels based on computational complexity. For example, the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
protocol [1] relies on solving large number factorization problems, and the elliptic-curve-based protocol [2, 3] depends
on discrete logarithms. Unfortunately, these protocols would all be cracked through the advancement of mathematical
algorithms or the emergence of quantum computers.
In contrast, the security of quantum digital signatures (QDSs) is based on quantum mechanics laws. QDSs have
proven to provide information-theoretic security and thus attracted a lot of attention from the scientific world. Since
the first QDS protocol was proposed in 2001 [4] and the first experimental demonstration was accomplished in 2012
[5], many obstacles to practical applications have been removed (e.g., the demanding of quantum memories; releasing
secure quantum channels [6–8]), such that the quantum key distribution protocols [9] can be implemented in the
key distribution stage [10]). Furthermore, measurement-device-independent (MDI) protocols [11, 12] were proposed
to solve side-channel attacks on measurements. The passive protocol [13] can avoid information leakage that occurs
during the intensity modulating process. To date, many theoretical and experimental studies have been examined
this subject matter [14–19].
With present QDS protocols, a good balance between security and practical performance is still difficult to achieve.
For example, one can obtain a higher signature rate with a lower level of security when using BB84-type QDS protocols.
In contrast, MDI-type QDS protocols feature a higher level of security but worse signature rates. Most importantly,
both protocol types cannot exceed the fundamental limit of channel capacities without quantum repeaters, as in QKD
[20, 21]. To overcome this fundamental limit in QKD, Lucamarini et al. proposed the so-called twin-field quantum
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2key distribution (TF-QKD) protocol [22] and obtained excellent security and practical performance. Inspired by
Lucamarini et al., we for the first time present a twin-field quantum digital signature (TF-QDS) protocol. We first
implement a sending-or-not-sending (SNS) protocol [23, 24] into the key distribution stage, and analyze its security
against general attacks within QDSs (e.g., forging and repudiation attacks) by taking finite-size-effects into account.
Furthermore, we perform corresponding numerical simulations and full parameter optimizations. When compared
to other protocols such as BB84-QDS [8] and MDI-QDS [11], our method exhibits outstanding results in terms of
signature rates and transmission distances.
II. TWIN-FIELD QDS
A. Protocol procedure
A schematic diagram of our protocol is shown in Fig. 1, which consists of two stages, distribution stage and
messaging stage. During the distribution stage, Alice-Bob and Alice-Charlie independently implement a twin-field
key generation protocol (TF-KGP) to generate correlated bit strings, where Alice-Bob and Alice-Charlie send twin-
field states to the untrusted party (Eve), and Eve performs a projection measurement. The messaging stage involves
sending and signing classical messages, where Alice is the sender and Bob and Charlie are the two recipients. During
the distribution stage, we adopt the SNS protocol [23, 24].
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FIG. 1: Schematic of the TF-QDS protocol. The pairs Alice-Bob and Alice-Charlie perform TF-KGP separately through Eve
to generate keys, while Bob and Charlie share a secret channel to Alice to exchange partial keys. In the TF-KGP, Alice-Bob
and Alice-Charlie prepare signal and decoy states using a phase modulator (PM) and intensity modulator (IM), after which
they send quantum signals to an untrusted party (Eve) to complete the measurement. Finally, Alice’s signature is sent to Bob
for authentication, and forwarded to Charlie for further verification.
Distribution stage: (1) Alice-Bob and Alice-Charlie individually generate N photon pulses and code them using
3a phase modulator (PM) and intensity modulator (IM). During this process, each pulse is randomly chosen as the
X (decoy) or Z (signal) window. In the X window, each side randomly prepares and sends out a phase-randomized
coherent state with intensity x, x ∈ {0, w, v}. In the Z window, a phase-randomized coherent state with intensity u
is sent with a probability ps, and nothing is sent with probability 1− ps.
(2) Eve carries out the projection measurement on the received pulse pairs with a beam-splitter (BS) and two
detectors (denoted as D0, D1), and publicly announces the detection results. If one of two detectors clicks, it is
recorded as a successful event.
(3) Alice-Bob (Alice-Charlie) publicly announce their windows used for each pulse pair. The only successful mea-
surement results kept are ones in which they use the same windows. Furthermore, if they both use X windows, the
phase and decoy states of each pulse should also be disclosed.
(4) Alice-Bob (Alice-Charlie) use the data on Z windows to extract sifted keys and the data on X windows to
estimate parameters. In addition, they randomly sacrifice a small number of bits on the Z windows for an error rate
test, leaving the remainder as a signature key pool.
(5) For a future possible message m (m = 0 or 1), Alice-Bob (Alice-Charlie) choose a length-L block from the key
pool to form the signature sequence ABm and B
A
m (A
C
m and C
A
m), where A
B
m and A
C
m are held by Alice, and B
A
m (C
A
m)
are held by Bob (Charlie).
(6) Bob and Charlie randomly choose half of their own key bits to exchange through the Bob-Charlie secret channel.
The kept half is denoted as BAm,keep (C
A
m,keep ), and the other half as B
A
m,forward (C
A
m,forward). Bob’s and Charlie’s
symmetrized keys were labeled as SBm = (B
A
m,keep, C
A
m,forward) and S
C
m = (C
A
m,keep, B
A
m,forward), respectively.
Messaging stage: (7) Alice sends the signature, (m,Sigm), to a recipient (such as Bob), where Sigm = (A
B
m, A
C
m).
(8) Bob compares his SBm with (m,Sigm) and records the number of mismatches. If the mismatches are fewer than
saL/2 in both key halves, Bob accepts the message and goes to the next step; otherwise, he rejects the message and
aborts this round. Here, sa is the authentication threshold associated with the security level of the QDS protocol.
(9) Bob forwards (m,Sigm) to Charlie.
(10) Charlie also checks the forwarded message in the same way, but with another threshold sv (sv > sa). Charlie
accepts the forwarded message if the number of mismatches in both key halves is below svL/2.
TF-KGP includes steps (1) − (4) in the distribution stage. It is essentially the quantum portion of the SNS TF-
QKD scheme but without error correction and privacy amplification. Detailed definitions of TF-KGP are presented
in Appendix A, including sifted key size, error test keys, and the key pool as nZ , ntest and npool, respectively, and
nZ = ntest+npool. In step (6) of the distribution stage, we assume the key exchange (also called key symmetrization)
between Bob and Charlie is through the Bob-Charlie secret channel, which can be realized with a TF-QKD process
performed by Bob and Charlie.
B. Security analysis
In a QDS, although all components on Z windows are used to generate keys for signature, security still depends on
the single-photon components. In TF-QDS, the min-entropy resulting from single-photon components in the half of
keys kept by Bob or Charlie at the presence of Eve is
Hǫmin(U
A
m,keep
∣∣E) > nL,1[1−H2(eL,1)], (1)
where U ∈ {B,C} denotes user Bob or Charlie, and E refers to the system of Eve; nL,1 and eL,1 represent the lower
bound of single-photon counts and the upper bound of single-photon error rate in UAm,keep, respectively; H2(x) =
−x log2(x) − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) is the binary Shannon entropy function. Eq. (1) uses a probability of 1 − ǫ, where
ǫ stands for the failure probability of the estimated parameters. In Appendix B, the derivations of these quantities
are explained. With Eq. (1), the minimum rate Pe at which Eve can introduce errors in U
A
m,keep (length L/2) can be
evaluated as
H2(Pe) =
2nL,1
L
[1−H2(eL,1)]. (2)
When doing security analysis of a TF-QDS protocol, robustness, forging, and repudiation probabilities should be
evaluated [8]. Robustness indicates the probability of the QDS aborting when Alice, Bob, and Charlie are all honest,
which is caused by an error test failure. Through the error rate of test keys Etest, we can estimate the error rate in
UAm,keep with the Serfling inequality [25] using
EUkeep 6 E
U
test +
2
L
√√√√(L2 + 1) (L2 + ntest) ln( 1ǫPE
)
2ntest
, (3)
4except with a failure probability ǫPE and Ekeep = max{EBkeep, ECkeep}. Considering there are failure possibilities for
both processes (Alice-Bob and Alice-Charlie), robustness probability can be expressed as
P(Robust) 6 2ǫPE . (4)
The repudiation probability characterizes Alice’s signature accepted by Bob but rejected by Charlie. To repudiate,
Alice must make the mismatch rate between both elements of SBm and the signature (m,Sigm) lower than sa. In
addition, Alice needs the mismatch rate between either element of SCm and the signature (m,Sigm) to be higher
than sv after the key exchange. The best strategy for Alice is to control the error rate of Bob and Charlie as
EBkeep = E
C
keep =
1
2 (sa + sv) [8], in which case the repudiation probability is bounded by
P(Repudiation) 6 2e−
1
4
(sv−sa)
2L, (5)
where sa = Ekeep + (Pe − Ekeep)
/
3, and sv = Ekeep + 2(Pe − Ekeep)
/
3
The forging indicates that the signature is not signed by Alice but would be accepted by Bob and Charlie. For
simplicity, we assume Bob is a forger. In order to forge, Bob must keep the mismatch rate between his declaration
(m,Sigm) and Charlie’s keys (SCm = (C
A
m,keep, B
A
m,forward)) being lower than a given value sv. Considering half of
Charlie’s string BAm,forward is forwarded by Bob, Bob needs only to guess the left half C
A
m,keep. The forging probability
includes all the process guessing CAm,keep, which is written as
P(Forge) 6 g + ǫF + ǫPE + ǫnL,1 + ǫeL,1 , (6)
where g and ǫF are associated with the probability that Bob finds a signature with an error rate smaller than sv,
defined by
ǫF :=
1
g
(
2
−
L
2
{
2nL,1
L
[1−H2(eL,1)]−H2(sv)
}
+ ǫ
)
. (7)
ǫPE , ǫn
L,1
and ǫeL,1 are the error probabilities related to the estimation of Ekeep, nL,1, and eL,1, respectively. To
define ε as the security level of the system, according to [26] it requires
max{P(Robust),P(Repudiation),P(Forge)} 6 ε. (8)
We now present a simple model to evaluate the performance of a QDS protocol with the desired security level ε.
We assume that for each run, the block of photon pulse pairs (N) to perform key distribution is known, and set npool
as the corresponding number of keys that can be used for signing. Subsequently we can calculate how many keys
are needed to sign a half-bit signature (L), and how many bits should be signed (nbits) with npool keys. Finally, the
signed bits and signature rate (bit/pulse) can be written as
nbits =
npool
2L
, (9)
R =
npool
2L
· 1
N
, (10)
respectively.
III. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In this section, we describe numerical simulations for our proposed TF-QDS protocol, with results shown in Figs.
2-4. In our simulations, we consider statistical fluctuations using Hoeffdings inequality [27] as in Ref. [8], and the
basic system parameters are listed in Table I. In addition, we set the number of phase slices to M = 16 [22] during
the TF-KGP processes, where the phase slice is the coding phase difference interval post-selected by Alice-Bob or
Alice-Charlie. In addition, we perform full parameter optimization on our TF-QDS, including the value of each
light intensity (w, v, u), probability of choosing signal window (pZ), probability of sending out the phase-randomized
coherent state u (ps), and probabilities of choosing different decoy intensities (pw and pv).
In Fig. 2, we illustrate the variation of npool, L, and nbits with varying transmission distances, given a data size of
N = 1013 and a security level of ε = 10−5, where nbits is shown with the left axis, and npool and L are indicated by
the right axis. The value of L increases rapidly and the value of nbits drops quickly as transmission distance increases,
5TABLE I: The basic system parameters used in our numerical simulations. α: the loss coefficient of fiber at telecommunication
wavelength; ηd and Pdc: detection efficiency and the dark count rate of detectors, respectively; ed: optical misalignment error;
rET : the ratio of keys used for the error test; ǫPE and ǫSF : failure probability of the error test and statistical fluctuation,
respectively; g: Bob’s probability of making svL/2 errors.
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FIG. 2: The size of key pool (npool), the length for signing message m (L), and the number of signed bits (nbits) versus the
total transmission distance. npool and L correspond to the right axis while nbits is indicated on the left axis. The data size is
N = 1013 and the security level is ε = 10−5 at all transmission distances.
especially after 300 km. These observations can be attributed to the finite-size effect, which is more sensitive at longer
transmission distances.
The signature rate of TF-QDS is plotted in Fig. 3, and compared to two typical QDS protocols, BB84-QDS [8]
and MDI-QDS [11]. We set the security level as ε = 10−5 and the data size as N = 1013 or N = 1015 [28]. For
fair comparisons, we also perform full parameter optimization on BB84-QDS and MDI-QDS. We can see from Fig. 3
that among the three protocols, our TF-QDS protocol exhibits the best performance at longer transmission distances.
For example, our TF-QDS can sign signatures at 300 km while the other two protocols stop signing at 230 km and
250 km, respectively. At shorter transmission distances, BB84-QDS exhibits the highest signature rate. However, it
possesses the lowest security level among the three protocols. Therefore, when taking security level into account, our
protocol exhibits the best performance in terms of both transmission distance and signature rate.
We also investigate the robustness of our TF-QDS protocol by plotting signature rate variations with changes in
the misalignment of the optical system in Fig. 4. Here, the transmission distance is set at 50 km and the security
level as ε = 10−5 or ε = 10−10. Fig. 4 shows that the signature rate decreases with increasing misalignment error.
The maximum tolerable misalignment error is 18%, which is much larger than values in the BB84 and MDI protocols,
and well within current experimental values [29–32]. Moreover, by setting a higher security level, a lower signature
rate can be obtained. Therefore, a reasonable security level should be chosen in practical applications of the TF-
QDS. In addition, due to the phase sensitivity of TF-KGP, we can use machine learning to achieve phase-modulation
stabilization [33], enhancing the practical performance of the TF-QDS system.
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FIG. 3: Signature rates of BB84-QDS [8], MDI-QDS [11], and TF-QDS with a security level of ε = 10−5. The dashed lines
represent results at data size N = 1013, and the solid lines at data size N = 1015.
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FIG. 4: Signature rates of TF-QDS versus optical misalignment errors with ε = 10−5 or ε = 10−10 at 50 km. Here, N = 1013.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we develop a TF-QDS protocol, which can possess the highest security level among all existing
QDS protocols, but also exhibit outstanding performance in terms of both signature rates and secure transmission
distances. For example, the TF-QDS protocol can achieve > 100 km longer secure transmission distance than either
BB84-QDS or MDI-QDS under the same experimental conditions, and exhibits a higher signature rate than MDI
protocol by several orders of magnitude after 200 km. Therefore, our work represents another step towards practical
implementation of QDS.
7To be noted, this is the first TF-QDS protocol, by adopting Wang et al.’s SNS scheme [23, 24]. In principle, other
types of TF schemes [34–37] and security analysis methods [38, 39] could also be implemented in QDS, and might show
even more interesting characteristics. This will be carried out in our future research work. As for the limitations of the
present QDS work, similar to existing TF-QKD protocols, it might pose high challenges for wide applications in the
field, e.g., it needs high speed and accurate multi-party synchronization, phase-locking and stabilization techniques.
Anyway, with the rapid development of modern technology, all these challenges will be readily solved. Therefore, our
work represents another step towards practical implementation of QDS.
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Appendix A: Some detailed notes on the TF-KGP
In this section, we provide detailed notes on the TF-KGP. We start by analyzing the TF-KGP procedure between
Alice and Bob, which is the SNS TF-QKD presented in [23, 24] without error correction and privacy amplification.
The phase-randomized coherent state prepared by Alice and Bob, respectively, can be expressed as
∣∣√xAeiθA〉 =∑∞
n=0
e−xA/2(
√
xAe
iθA)
n
√
n!
|n〉, ∣∣√xBeiθB〉 =∑∞
n=0
e−xB/2(
√
xBe
iθB )
n
√
n!
|n〉, (A1)
where xA (xB) and θA (θB) represent the intensity and phase of coherent state randomly chosen by Alice (Bob),
respectively. Here, xA, xB ∈ {0, w, v, u} and θA, θB are random in [0, 2π). Alice (Bob) randomly chooses a vacuum
state, decoy states (w, v), and Z windows with probabilities p0, pw, pv, pZ , respectively, where p0 + pw + pv + pZ = 1.
When a Z window is chosen, Alice (Bob) sends a signal state u with probability ps, and sends nothing with 1− ps.
When receiving the pulses from Alice and Bob, Charlie performs measurements and announces the results. During
the measurement process, if only one detector clicks, Charlie announces a successful event, recorded as a one-detector
heralded event, and announces which detector (D0 or D1) clicks. When the measurement process is complete and
results have been announced, Alice and Bob publicly disclose which window was used for each pulse pair. Only the
one-detector heralded events for which they both use X or Z windows are kept. When they both use X windows, the
phase and decoy state intensity should also be disclosed. However, when they both use Z windows, the phase and
SNS operation should be never disclosed. Furthermore, we need to post-select the effective events on X windows; it
is deemed an effective event if it is a one-detector heralded event where Alice and Bob both use X windows, the two
coherent states of Alice and Bob have the same intensity, and their phases satisfy the following post-selection criterion
|θA − θB − ψAB − kπ| ≤ ∆
2
. (A2)
In Eq. (A2), ψAB is the difference of global phases between Alice-Eve’s link and Bob-Eve’s link, which results in the
optical misalignment error (ed); k = 0, 1 corresponds to in-phase or anti-phase of θA and θB; ∆ =
2π
M represents the
size of each slice, and M refers to the total number of phase slices pre-chosen by Alice and Bob. The effective events
on X windows are the results of the single-photon interference and a subset of one-detector heralded events on X
windows.
For the one-detector heralded events on Z windows, Alice (Bob) denotes it as bit 0 if she (he) sends a vacuum
(phased-randomized weak coherent) state and as bit 1 if she (he) sends a phased-randomized weak coherent (vacuum)
state. For the effective events on X windows, a right click is the D0 (D1) detector clicking when k = 0 (k = 1), and
a wrong click is the D1 (D0) detector clicking when k = 0 (k = 1). The data on Z windows are defined as the key
bits distilled by the one-detector heralded events on Z windows, while the data on X windows are defined as the
one-detector heralded and effective events on X windows. The data on Z windows are used for the error test and
8signature, and finally Alice and Bob form an nZ-length key string Zs and Z
′
s, respectively. The data on X windows
are used to estimate single-photon contributions, i.e. the counts and error rates of the single-photon components
(nL,1, eL,1) on Z windows.
Appendix B: Finite-size estimations of parameters
In this section, we estimate nL,1 and eL,1 in finite size. The procedure can be decomposed into three steps.
Firstly, we estimate the lower bound of single-photon counts and upper bound of single-photon error counts on X
windows (nX,1 and mX,1, respectively) with the observed values taking statistical fluctuations into account. From the
data on X windows, we know the counts of one-detector heralded events with various intensity combinations (nab,
a, b ∈ {0, w, v}), and the counts of error clicks in effective events maa. With these observed values, we obtain
nX,1 > nX,1 =
τX,1
2wv(v − w)
[
v2ew(n−0w + n
−
w0)
P0w
− w
2ev(n+0v + n
+
v0)
P0v
− 2(v
2 − w2)n+00
P00
]
, (B1)
mX,1 6 mX,1 =
τX,1
v − w
[
evm+vv
P∆vv
− e
vm−ww
P∆ww
]
, (B2)
and the corresponding single-photon error rate on X windows is eX,1 = mX,1/nX,1. In Eqs. (B1) and (B2),
τX,1 is the probability of single-photon components with all intensity combinations on X windows, which is
τX,1 =
∑
a,b Pab(a+ b)e
−a−b. Pab is the probability of intensity combination ab, and P
∆
aa is the probability of ef-
fective events occurring with intensity combination aa, given by Pab = papb and P
∆
aa = 2p
2
a
∆
2π . The x
− and x+ in Eqs.
(B1) and (B2) are the observed values when considering the statistical fluctuations by the Hoeffding inequalities [27]
x˜ > x− := x− δ(x, ǫSF ), x˜ 6 x+ := x+ δ(x, ǫSF ), (B3)
with failure probability ǫSF , where
δ(x, ǫSF ) =
√
x ln(1/ǫSF )
2
. (B4)
Secondly, since the single-photon signals on X and Z windows are independent, we use nX,1 and mX,1 to estimate
the corresponding quantities on Z windows (nZ,1 and mZ,1) using the Serfling inequality [25]. The population for
single-photon preparations on Z windows is lower bounded by
NZ,1 = 2ps(1 − ps)ue−uNZ − δ(NZ , ǫSF ), (B5)
with confidence 1 − ǫSF , where NZ = p2ZN represents the runs of Alice and Bob both choosing the Z windows, and
δ(x, y) is the fluctuation in Hoeffding’s inequality [27]. Similarly, the population for single-photon preparations on X
windows is upper bounded by
NX,1 =
∑
a,b
[
(a+ b)e−a−bNab + δ(Nab, ǫSF )
]
, (B6)
with confidence 1−9ǫSF , where Nab = PabN represents Alice and Bob choosing an intensity combination ab on the X
windows. Subsequently, we can interpret the single-photon contributions on X or Z windows (nX,1, mX,1, nZ,1,mZ,1)
in the whole population of the single-photon preparations as an operation of sampling without replacement. The
Serfling inequality tells us that
nZ,1 > nZ,1 = nX,1
NZ,1
NX,1
−Υ(NZ,1, NX,1, ǫSF ), (B7)
mZ,1 6 mZ,1 = mX,1
nZ,1
nX,1
+Υ(nZ,1, nX,1, ǫSF ), (B8)
where confidence is 1 − ǫSF , and Υ(x, y, z) =
√
(x+ 1)(x+ y) ln(z−1)/(2y). The corresponding single-photon error
rate on Z windows is
eZ,1 =
mZ,1
nZ,1
. (B9)
9Thirdly, we can use nZ,1 and eZ,1 to estimate nL,1 and eL,1 in U
A
m,keep through the Serfling inequality with
nL,1 > nL,1 = nZ,1
L
2nZ
− Λ(nZ , L
2
, ǫSF ), (B10)
eL,1 6 eL,1 = eZ,1 +
1
nL,1
Λ(nZ,1, nL,1, ǫSF ), (B11)
where Λ(x, y, z) =
√
(x− y + 1)y ln(z−1)/(2x). Finally, we obtain nL,1 and eL,1.
In addition, we simulate the experimental observed values with the linear model presented in [24] and assume
symmetric case in the TF-KGP. If the total transmittance of the experiment setups is η = ηd10
−
α
20 , then we have
n00 =2Pdc (1− Pdc)N00,
n0w =nw0 = 2
[
(1− Pdc) eηw/2 − (1− Pdc)2 e−ηw
]
N0w,
n0v =nv0 = 2
[
(1− Pdc) eηw/2 − (1− Pdc)2 e−ηw
]
N0v,
mww =ed
[
(1− Pdc) 1
∆
∫ ∆
2
−
∆
2
e−2ηw sin
2 θAB
2 dθAB − (1− Pdc)2 e−2ηw
]
P∆wwN
+ (1− ed)
[
(1− Pdc) 1
∆
∫ ∆
2
−
∆
2
e−2ηw cos
2 θAB
2 dθAB − (1− Pdc)2 e−2ηw
]
P∆wwN,
mvv =ed
[
(1− Pdc) 1
∆
∫ ∆
2
−
∆
2
e−2ηv sin
2 θAB
2 dθAB − (1− Pdc)2 e−2ηv
]
P∆vvN
+ (1− ed)
[
(1− Pdc) 1
∆
∫ ∆
2
−
∆
2
e−2ηv cos
2 θAB
2 dθAB − (1− Pdc)2 e−2ηv
]
P∆vvN,
and
nZ =2(1− ps)2Pdc(1 − Pdc)NZ + 4ps(1− ps)
[
(1− Pdc)e−ηu/2 − (1− Pdc)2e−ηu
]
NZ
+ 2p2s
[
(1− Pdc)e−ηu 1
2π
∫ 2π
0
eηu cos θABdθAB − (1 − Pdc)2e−2ηu
]
NZ ,
where θAB = θA − θB.
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